The Intermediary role of microloan officers: Evidence from Ethiopia by Shchetinin, Oleg & Wollbrant, Conny
WORKING PAPERS IN ECONOMICS
No 581
The intermediary role of microloan officers: Evidence
from Ethiopia
Oleg Shchetinin and Conny Wollbrant
December 2013
ISSN 1403-2473 (print)
ISSN 1403-2465 (online)
Department of Economics
School of Business, Economics and Law at University of Gothenburg
Vasagatan 1, PO Box 640, SE 405 30 Göteborg, Sweden 
+46 31 786 0000, +46 31 786 1326 (fax)
www.handels.gu.se    info@handels.gu.se
The intermediary role of microloan officers:
Evidence from Ethiopia∗
Oleg Shchetinin† Conny Wollbrant‡
December 12, 2003
Abstract
Microfinance institutions are key financial intermediaries between do-
nors and borrowers in developing countries. Loan officers are crucial for
establishing and maintaining the relationship between borrowers and mi-
crofinance institutions. This paper studies the impact of loan officers on
the loan portfolio. We use a survey and choice experiment of 800 loan of-
ficers to estimate loan officers’ preferences over loan allocation. We inves-
tigate how these preferences are affected by the organizational structure
of the microfinance institution, for example, incentive provision. We pay
special attention to monitoring of borrowers and loan officer discretion.
The most important determinants of loan allocation are related to the
financial viability of microfinance institutions rather than the pro-social
mission of microfinance. We derive recommendations for the governance
of microfinance institutions.
Keywords: Financial intermediation, Microfinance, Loan officers, Loan alloca-
tion, Choice experiment
JEL Classification Codes: G21, L31, O16
∗We are grateful for helpful suggestions and comments from Yonas Alem. Financial support
from the Adlerbertska Foundation (Adlerbertska Forskningsstiftelsen) is gratefully acknowl-
edged. We are grateful for organizational support provided by the Association of Ethiopian
Microfinance Institutions (AEMFI) and especially to Dr. Wolday Amha, and to the managers
of all participating MFIs. We are grateful to the Addis Ababa University and especially to
Tekie Alemu for valuable comments and his support during the entire field stage. Excellent
research assistance was provided by Hailu Elias, Atnafu G. Meskel, Atlaw Alemu, Getachew
Adane, Sisay Addis, Kassahum Alem, Takele Berhanu, Gelana Deme, Solomon Hmarian,
Amanuel Jessehaye and Hibiret Tsehay. We are also grateful to Hailu Elias for manu insight-
ful discussions. Remaining errors are our own.
†The University of Gothenburg, School of Business, Economics and Law, Department of
Economics. Phone: +46 31 7861344. E-mail: oleg.shchetinin@economics.gu.se
‡The University of Gothenburg, School of Business, Economics and Law, Department of
Economics. Phone: +46 31 7862615. E-mail: conny.wollbrant@economics.gu.se
1
1 Introduction
Microfinance institutions (MFIs) are the main channel for providing access to
finance by acting as financial intermediaries between donors and the poor in the
developing world. Because of lack of collateral, the poor cannot obtain financing
for their entrepreneurial projects from conventional banks and are locked in
poverty traps.1 This paper contributes to the currently developing literature on
the organizational structure of MFIs and its impact on financial intermediation.
We focus on Loan Officers (LOs), who themselves play an intermediary role
between borrowers and the MFI. In particular, we study how organizational
features of MFIs, such as incentives provided to the LO, affect loan allocation
and therefore shape the portfolio of clients. The LO is a key actor within the
MFI and determines the success of microfinance, both in terms of social missions
and financial performance.
Our paper is, to the best of our knowledge, the first to provide a detailed
examination of the impact of monitoring difficulty and applicants’ savings on
loan allocation and the role of LO discretion in the monitoring process. Informa-
tion about a borrower is acquired during monitoring and its transmission to the
MFI is subject to LO discretion. Monitoring and LO discretion are particularly
important in the context of microfinance due to the softness of information;
borrower–MFI contracts therefore contain a substantial relational component.
From the broader perspective of financial intermediation, there exists no direct
channel by which borrowers can be provided direct access to funds available
from donors; instead MFIs act as intermediaries. From the organizational per-
spective of MFIs, LOs stand out as particularly important for the delivery of
financial access to the desired clientele.
In this paper, loan officers are placed at the center. The interaction of LOs
with MFI clientele goes mainly through two channels: first, when evaluating
applications for microloans and, second, when monitoring the performance of
1Armenda´riz and Morduch (2010) provide a detailed account of the development of micro-
finance.
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Donors provide funds for MFIs
MFIs allocate funds to borrowers
Loan officers make allocation de-
cisions and monitor borrowers
Figure 1: The flow of funds to and inside microfinance sector
the approved loan. We study in detail LOs’ preferences over loan allocation,
and a number of aspects related to monitoring: what makes monitoring difficult,
how often do LOs exercise discretion, to what extent do they bend rules in case
of unsatisfactory performance, and how proficient they are. On top of this, we
study how LOs’ alignment with the perceived objectives of MFIs influences their
performance. Surprisingly, the literature on microfinance until very recently
paid little attention to LOs and their role in microfinance (see Cole and Duflo
(2004), Labie et al. (2010) and Sagamba et al. (2013) for exceptions).
Our study is based on a survey of LOs and managers of MFI branches. We
managed to involve 800 LOs from 8 MFIs in Ethiopia. Our sample of LOs
is representative of the whole country as it involves LOs from both big and
small MFIs located in different parts of the country. An important part of the
study is a choice experiment with LOs. In the choice experiment, participants
were presented with a pair of applicant profiles, and were asked to indicate
which one they preferred for loan allocation. Every LO was presented with 16
such pairs. Profiles contained both information about the applicant and the
project. Applicant characteristics are gender, age and poverty level. These
characteristics are not only relevant from a social perspective, but are often
stated explicitly in MFI mission statements. Project characteristics are the
probability of timely reimbursement as an indicator of project quality, difficulty
3
of monitoring, loan size, and savings beyond the required minimum. In addition,
LOs were presented with a questionnaire that asked about incentive practices,
perceived mission of their MFI, training in MFI related activities, exercise of
discretion, distribution of work tasks and a few attitudinal questions.
The choice experimental methodology employed in our study is novel in
research on the internal structure of microfinance institutions. In our view,
there are strong grounds for employing choice experiments for the study of this
topic. Indeed, choice experiments (among other experimental methods) provide
a possibility to assess factors influencing decisions of LOs and/or other involved
parties, which otherwise are difficult to assess, since the necessary data is miss-
ing or very hard to collect. Controlled experiments allow observing the choices
and other behaviors of economic actors and provide the necessary data. In this
way, the choice experiment methodology represents an important tool which
can potentially deliver new insights.2 The downside of choice experiments is
that the choices made by participants are would-be choices rather than real life
choices. Real choices are, however, impossible to observe since MFIs do not sys-
tematically store information about rejected applications for microloans. For
this reason, empirical studies based on approved applicants will be subject to
selection bias. In such circumstances, a choice experiment is a plausible alter-
native for studying the decisions of LOs and factors influencing these decisions.
In line with previous studies (e.g., Sagamba et al. (2013)), we find that, in
general, project characteristics have stronger effects on LOs’ preferences for loan
allocation than social characteristics of applicants. With respect to applicant
characteristics, women have a higher chance of being allocated a microloan, as
do the extremely poor and those with savings beyond the required minimum.
Increasing age initially benefits the applicant, but these benefits peak and later
fall to become negative; the effect of age on LO preferences is therefore non-
monotonic. With respect to project characteristics, the probability of timely
reimbursement has a strong positive effect on LO preferences, while the difficulty
2See Harrison and List (2004) and Levitt and List (2009) for survey of experimental eco-
nomics.
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of monitoring has a strong negative effect.
Comparing the effect of monitoring difficulty on LO preferences by incen-
tive type provided by the MFI, mission perception, and discretion exercised in
reporting and sanctioning, we find large variation in the effect of high levels
of monitoring difficulty. For instance, the effect of monitoring difficulty is less
important to the LO if she is incentivized to provide loans to the poorest, and
similarly, if she perceives the mission of her MFI as supporting the poor. In
addition, levels of monitoring difficulty can be less important in general if the
LO exercises high levels of discretion in reporting clients and recommending
sanctions when guidelines state these ought to be implemented. Our results
provide evidence for an important role of interactions between LO preferences
and organizational features of the MFI in determining the microloan portfolio,
and hence the social impact and performance of microfinance.
From a broader perspective, the organizational structure of MFIs, and its
impact on decisions of LOs and on the performance of MFIs, have so far not been
thoroughly investigated, except for a few studies that focus on individual MFIs.
These studies find that LOs exercise significant discretion in abiding by rules
set forth by the MFI in line with their own interpretation of the consequences of
compliance (Canales (2011)), and that LOs often have to be prepared to negoti-
ate, and sometimes engage in conflict with non-compliant borrowers (Battilana
and Dorado (2010)). The role of the LO, therefore, is not limited to mechanical
implementation of formal guidelines, but there is significant scope for LO pref-
erences and incentives to have an important impact on the performance of the
MFI.
The literature exploring the relationship between LO preferences and orga-
nizational features such as incentives and monitoring is rather nascent. Labie
et al. (2010) show that incentives provided to the LO may reduce problems of
discrimination in loan allocation. Agier and Szafarz (2012) show that, despite
incentives being provided, LO preferences still interfere with loan allocation.
Canales (2011) demonstrates that LOs tend to bend formal rules and thus ex-
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ercise substantial discretion in their operations.
Monitoring of borrowers is the crucial determinant of performance of MFI.
Modern microfinance started in the 1970s and employed mainly group lending
(see ch.4 in Armenda´riz and Morduch (2010)), where the group peer monitoring
and peer social pressure played a crucial role in alleviating the problems related
to the softness of information. Currently, individual loans have become more
common in microfinance (see, e.g., Cull et al. (2009)), and peer monitoring needs
to be substituted by another mechanism, suitable for individual loans, to ensure
good performance of the loans, for instance, proper usage and timely repayment.
The alternative mechanism is to have the LO monitor borrowers, and no other
alternative has yet been devised. Loan officers therefore play an important role
in enforcing microloan performance and repayment by constantly monitoring
borrowers.
LO discretion, i.e., ”real authority”, over loan allocation and sanctioning,
as opposed to formal authority (see Aghion and Tirole (1997)), is an important
determinant of the performance of MFIs. Microfinance can be seen as a limiting
case of financing small businesses, which is known to be very sensitive to the
discretion exercised by loan officers (see Hertzberg et al. (2010) and Berger et
al. (2005)). Indeed, financing small businesses requires collecting and acting
on soft information; relational contracting emerges as an important contract
enforcement tool. The nature of relational contracting gives rise to a greater
role of LO discretion. These aspects are present and amplified in the context of
microfinance.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides background
information about Ethiopia and Ethiopian Microfinance. Section 3 explains our
methodology. Section 4 presents results related to the monitoring process and
LO discretion. Section 5 presents results on LO decisions on loan allocation.
Section 6 discusses implications. Finally, section 7 concludes the paper.
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2 The Case of Ethiopia
2.1 Economic background of Ethiopia
Ethiopia is one of the poorest countries in the world with GNI per capita (PPP)
of 1030 USD.3 This figure can be compared with some reference numbers: the
average values for low income countries is 1303, for least developed countries
it is 1498, and for Sub-Saharan Africa it is 2130. The last number is almost
twice as large as the Ethiopian GNI per capita. Ethiopia is the second most
populated country in Africa with a population of about 83 million people.
The economy of Ethiopia is dominated by agriculture which accounts for
47.7% of GDP. A lot of economic activity, especially of individual entrepreneurs,
e.g., smallholder farmers, is geographically disperse. Additionally, the terrain is
difficult and the population is scattered across many parts of the country. The
combination of a very poor population with disperse economic activity amplifies
the very high demand for small scale financial services.
These financial services cannot be provided by standard financial institu-
tions and as a result, an institutional void emerges. This problem is common
for developing countries, for instance, in Sub-Saharan Africa, but it is especially
pressing in Ethiopia. Indeed, access to finance is the major problem for doing
business in Ethiopia for all big and small enterprises (The World Bank (2011)).
About one third (33.2%) of all enterprises characterize access to finance as the
main obstacle for doing business, as compared to only 20.5% for the whole sub-
Saharan Africa.4 38.4% of small firms in Ethiopia (1 − 19 employees) identify
access to finance as the main problem, while for medium and large size firms
these figures correspond to 29.5% and 23.8%, respectively. This implies that
microfinance in Ethiopia is a more important development factor than in com-
parable countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and that the scope for microfinance
activities is perhaps larger in Ethiopia than in any other African country.
The economic environment in which Ethiopian MFIs operate is generally
3All the macroeconomic indicators in this part of the paper are taken from WDI 2010.
4The main problem for the region of Sub-Saharan Africa is access to electricity.
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similar to that of many other African countries. Furthermore, problems related
to providing access to finance are similar all over Africa, although amplified in
the Ethiopian case. In this way, the Ethiopian case is worthy of study in its own
right, but is also informative for understanding microfinance in other African
countries.
2.2 An overview of microfinance in Ethiopia
Informal financial institutions are widespread in Ethiopia and has a long history.
The most common and organized are iddir and iqub. Iddir is an indigenous
institution where members make regular contributions to a common pool. The
money from the pool can be used to support a needy member of iddir.5 In
this way, iddir is an informal insurance institution. Iqub is a rotating savings
and credit association. The membership in both is usually based on earlier
established social ties.
The origins of formal microcredit in Ethiopia can be traced back to 1980s
when some NGOs, both international and local, started microcredit programs as
part of their relief and rehabilitation programs. At the time these were mainly
small programs, their activity was neither coordinated nor regulated, and entry
was free.
Free entry has advantages and disadvantages from the point of view of the
viability of microfinance. Whereas advantages are obvious, disadvantages are
more subtle. For instance, some less constrained microcredit programs may fail
to implement financial discipline for the borrowers and as a result, the devel-
opment impact is undermined; some borrowers fail to develop their enterprises
and in fact perceive the loan as a gift.
Under uncontrolled entry, many microcredit programs funds are based on
donations and lack long-term objectives. In this case, financial viability is not
a concern for the program; the main objective of such an MFI is rather to
disburse money to needy people. As a result, these microcredit programs do
5In iddir, money are often used to cover funeral expenses of member household.
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not control how the money is used by the recipients and often do not enforce
repayment. Compared to MFIs that carefully select borrowers, monitor the use
of loans and enforce repayment, the microcredit programs primarily aimed at
disbursing money have lower operational cost and, consequently, lower interest
rates. They are also typically short–lived. At the same time, their presence
is likely to spoil the activity of MFIs relying on self-sustainability. The latter
typically have long-term development plans and are deeply integrated in the
society. This speaks in favor of controlling the entry of MFIs.
Since 1996, the activities of MFIs are regulated by a number of Proclama-
tions. The proclamation 40/1996 requires legal registration of MFI with the
National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE). It also establishes the requirement for all
MFIs to be non-profit. This distinguishes microfinance in Ethiopia from most
of other countries where both profit-seeking and non-profit MFIs can operate.
The proclamation also requires that all MFIs should take deposits. This re-
quirement is supposed to improve sustainability of the MFIs.
Most of the currently existing MFIs have evolved from NGOs credit programs
or from Government programs, and many of them still keep strong relationships
with the institutions of their origin. In 2011, there were about 30 registered
MFIs.
3 Methodology and Data
3.1 The Survey Design
Our study consists of a survey and a choice experiment with LOs. In the survey
we collected background information on microloan officers (age, gender, experi-
ence etc.); information on incentives provided to LOs; in-depth information on
processing of applications for microloans and on the monitoring routines. We
also elicited the alignment of LO views with the perceived objectives of the LO’s
MFI.
In the choice experiment, LOs were asked to compare 16 pairs of hypothet-
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ical applicants for a microloan. The profiles of applicants were presented in a
standardized form. Each profile consisted of 7 characteristics of applicant and
his/her entrepreneurial project; see Table 3.1 for the details.6 For every pair,
LOs were asked to indicate which applicant is preferred for microloan attribu-
tion and how sure they are of their choice. The purpose of the choice experiment
is to elicit LOs preferences over microloan allocation.
Table 1: The list of attributes and its values.
Attribute # of values List of values
Age 5 18; 22; 27; 34; 44 years
Gender 2 Female; Male
Poverty level 3 Poor; Very poor; Extremely poor
Prob. of timely
repayment
4 Graphical scale, ranging from ”half of the
cases” to almost sure
The size of the
loan
3 Small; Medium; Large
Difficulty of
monitoring
3 Easy; With some difficulties; Difficult
Monthly sav-
ings
3 At the minimal required level; Slightly
more; Much more
The survey of LOs and the choice experiment were merged into one ques-
tionnaire. This questionnaire was in English, but native-speaking assistants
explained the questions and the task in the choice experiment to the LOs. To
avoid any order effects, we randomized the order in which the choice experiment
and survey was presented to the respondent.
3.2 The data
We surveyed in total 800 LOs. The study covered various geographical areas in
Ethiopia: the city of Addis-Ababa and three largest regions (kilils): SNNP7 on
the south, Oromia located in the central and eastern part of the country and
Amhara on the north-west. The geographical breakdown of our study is shown
in table 2. We surveyed LOs from 224 woredas (districts).
6We modified the choice experiment design in Sagamba et al. (2013) by removing three char-
acteristics of family/household of the applicant, and adding the characterization of monthly
savings.
7SNNP is the Southern Nations, Nationalities and People’s Region
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Table 2: The Number of loan officers by region
Region (kilil) Number of LO
The city of Addis Ababa 172
SNNP 217
Oromia 195
Amhara 216
Total 800
The survey covers 8 MFIs with diverse characteristics. MFIs are of different
size, and they vary in geographical cover.8 Below we provide a general sample
description.
In our sample, 80% of the surveyed LOs were men, which reflects the gender
composition of LOs in Ethiopia. Almost all of the LOs are between 20 and 39
years old, more precisely, 59% are of age 20 − 29, and 36% are 30− 39 age old.
Most of the LOs have a high school diploma (67%), and 16% have a university
diploma. Only 16% LOs have not completed high school. The majority of LOs
are very experienced in microfinance: 39% have worked in microfinance for more
than 5 years, and 21% for 3 to 5 years. The remaining 40% have worked for
less than 3 years. LOs tend to stick to one MFI: about 90% of LOs have always
worked in the same MFI. See Appendix D.1 for details.
3.3 Preferences of Loan Officer over Loan Allocation: Em-
pirical Model
The main tool for the analysis of the preferences of LOs over loan applicants,
determining microloan allocation, is the choice experiment methodology. We
follow Sagamba et al. (2013), but extend their investigation and put specific
focus on the role of monitoring and initial savings of applicants.
Consider an LO deciding on whether to grant (or to recommend granting)
a microloan to an applicant with some project.9 In this decision the LO takes
8For example, Wisdom covers the whole of Ethiopia while other MFIs such as OMO are
concentrated in a single region.
9The final decision on microloan allocation is made by some committee, not by the LO
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into account two groups of factors: characteristics of the project and character-
istics of the applicant. Let us denote the values of these factors for applicant
i by xi = (xi1, xi2, . . . , xiK). Additionally, the personality of the LO together
with environment in which he/she operates, which in turn is determined by the
incentives provided to the LO by MFI and his/her alignment with MFI mis-
sion/perceived objectives, influence the decision. Let us denote these additional
factors influencing LO j by zj = (zj1, . . . , zjL). There is also a random compo-
nent εij . The above mentioned factors determine the subjective benefit u of LO
j from allocating a microloan to an applicant i:
uji = f(xi, zj , εij)
We further assume that the function f is linear in the applicant’s and
project’s characteristics xi with coefficients that can be LO-specific and are
determined by the LO personality and environment, and that the random com-
ponent is additive:
uji =
K∑
k=1
βk(zj)xik + εij (1)
The LO is presented with a pair of applicants and should decide which
one he/she prefers. The decision is based on the comparison of the subjective
utilities from allocating microloan to either of the two applicants uj1 and uj2.
The probability that applicant 1 is preferred to applicant 2 by the LO j is,
therefore, given by P = Prob
(
K∑
k=1
βk(zj)x1k + ε1j ≥
K∑
k=1
βk(zj)x2k + ε2j
)
.
For the purpose of the choice experiment, the variables xik are chosen to be
categorical, so that each variable xik can take values c = 1, 2, . . . , Ck. See table
3.1 for the list of values of each variable. To study the impact of LO-specific (or
environment specific) components on the preferences of the LO, the coefficients
β are decomposed into population-common component βˉ and officer-specific (or
environment-specific) component β˜: β = βˉ + β˜ (β˜ = 0 for those LOs for whom
personally. However, the LO is much better informed about the applicant, and because of
this the decision is based on the recommendation of LO. Deviations are rare.
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the feature of the environment under investigation is not present). Consequently,
the estimated econometric specification for the choice experiment is
uji =
7∑
k=1
Ck∑
c=1
βˉkcIxik=c +
7∑
k=1
Ck∑
c=1
β˜kcIxik=c + εji (2)
3.4 Estimation procedure
In order to estimate the empirical model in (2), we use the alternative-specific
conditional logit model (also known as McFadden’s choice model – see McFadden
(1974)). As standard, it is assumed that errors εji have a Gumbel distribution.
In the main estimations it is assumed that errors εji are clustered across officers.
As robustness checks, we re-estimate the same models under assumptions that
standard errors are not clustered, by using robust White estimator and by using
bootstrap.
4 The Monitoring Process
In this part we provide an analysis of the components of monitoring in Ethiopian
MFIs and the role of LO in the process of monitoring.
4.1 Monitoring is more than Inspection
Monitoring is commonly perceived as mere inspection of the state of a borrower’s
enterprise with the purpose of reducing moral hazard and ensuring timely re-
payment.
While on-site inspection is an important part of monitoring activities in
microfinance, this interaction between the LO and a borrower is not limited
to inspection. According to our findings, 80% of LOs give advice on running
the enterprise, 78% check the physical state of the enterprise, 70% advise on
budgeting, 68% discuss plans for the future with the borrower and 51% check
accounting records (see Appendix D.2). Although checking accounting records
and the physical state of the enterprise can be considered instances of pure
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inspection, all other above mentioned activities are beyond the scope of pure
inspection. Moreover, our results indicate that advising a borrower is as frequent
as pure inspection activities. This is due to LOs being proficient in many aspects
of the organization of entrepreneurial activity, such as bookkeeping, organizing
production, marketing and sales; more than 70% reported that they have a high
degree of competence in bookkeeping, organizing production and finding clients
for a microenterprise, 60% are highly competent in finding sales possibilities,
and 48% are highly competent in buying equipment for a microenterprise.10
This general provision of advice leads to a broad communication and the LO
acquiring intimate knowledge of the borrower and the enterprise conducive to
the emergence of close relationships.
The monitoring process is an important constituent of the relationship be-
tween an MFI and a borrower. The LO is the key element in this relationship
because the LO collects and transmits information about the borrower to the
MFI. Furthermore, the LO can moderate which part of the collected information
will be passed on to the MFI. Therefore, MFI knowledge about the borrower
is determined both by (i) the quality of information obtained by LO during
monitoring, and (ii) by the LO’s willingness to transmit this information to the
MFI; its knowledge in this regard is subject to the discretion of the LO. We
investigated in detail these two aspects of information transmission in microfi-
nance.
First, we studied what makes monitoring more difficult. According to our
findings, the two main factors are the distance to the borrower’s enterprise and
the time necessary for monitoring. Respectively, 54% and 53% of LOs assessed
the importance of these factors as either 5 or 6 on a scale from 1 to 6. A slightly
less important factor is the non-cooperativeness of the borrower, as only 41%
of LOs assessed it as 5 or 6 (see Appendix D.2). These results suggest that
monitoring difficulty in Ethiopia can be attributed primarily to geographical
10The answers for every competence were given on a scale from 1 to 6, where 1 corresponds
to ”not at all competent”, and 6 to ”very competent”. We interpreted 5 and 6 as high
competence. See details in Appendix D.1.
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factors or the complexity of an entrepreneurial project but also borrowers’ lack
of cooperation. This is consistent with LOs devoting a large amount of time to
monitoring.
Second, we studied factors determining the LO’s willingness to transmit
information about a borrower’s project to the MFI. This is the subject of the
next section.
4.2 Discretion of Loan Officers
We presume that a major determinant of the LO’s willingness to transmit in-
formation to the MFI, is the alignment of LO’s views on microfinance with
the perceived objectives of the MFI. We found that about one third of LOs
(30%) reported that their own views are fully aligned with their perception of
their MFI’s objectives; another third (34%) reported that their own views are
strongly aligned; 20% reported that their views are in general aligned; 17% re-
ported that their views are more or less aligned. We also found that 70% of LOs
perceive helping the poor as the main objective of their MFI. Others perceived
the main objective of the MFI to be supporting women (6%), achieving financial
sustainability (13%), or making profit (6%). See Appendix D.4 for details.
The scope for the LO to exercise discretion is related to the soft nature of
information. Indeed, the MFI cannot verify the state of an enterprise without
the aid of an LO. Difficulties with the running of an entrepreneurial project or
even violations of loan usage rules might be revealed during monitoring. In such
an instance, the LO is supposed to report these issues to the MFI. Especially
following a serious violation of loan usage, sanctions should be imposed on the
borrower, according to the rules of microloan provision. For the MFI, a report
from the LO is virtually the only way to learn about the borrower’s issues.
The LO, however, can postpone reporting, providing the borrower with some
additional wiggle-room, or even decide not to report at all.
We found that exercising some degree of discretion is very common among
LOs. Only 25% of LOs report immediately when a minor problem is detected
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(such as a delay with repayment of a farmer due to bad weather conditions),
and 33% report immediately in case of a more serious problem that requires
the imposition of a sanction.11 At the same time, most LOs exercise only a
limited degree of discretion, such as postponing reporting to give a borrower
some additional time to overcome the problem; 51% of LOs postpone reporting
for a minor problem, and 42% for a more serious violation. Finally, a substantial
number of LOs (25%) exercise quite a strong degree of discretion, i.e., they do
not report any minor problem; 19% do not even report more serious violations
(see Appendix D.3). These results confirm the significance of the LOs discretion
for MFI knowledge of the borrower.
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Preferences over Loan Allocation
We first report the result of the baseline estimation. We estimate equation (3).
uji =
7∑
k=1
Ck∑
c=1
βˉkcIxik=c +
7∑
k=1
Ck∑
c=1
β˜kcIxik=c + εji (3)
Average marginal effects corresponding to coefficients are reported in Table
3, detailed results of estimations are provided in Appendix A
5.1.1 Socially desirable groups
Women have a 6% higher chance of being allocated a microloan, holding other
things equal. This is consistent with the pro-social mission of microfinance,
reflecting the aim of empowering women. Age has a non-monotone effect on the
likelihood of being attributed a loan. Older applicants are preferred to younger
up to the age of about 30, but for older applicants, the likelihood of obtaining
a microloan declines; an 18-year old applicant has a 5% lower chance than a 27-
year old, and a 44-year old applicant has a 7% lower chance. A similar pattern
11The problem is minor when its detection requires only reporting to MFI, without imme-
diate sanction imposition.
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Table 3: Marginal Effects for the Pooled Estimation.
dp/dx
age: 22 .044***
age: 27 .052***
age: 34 .030***
age: 44 -.022**
gender: male -.058***
poverty: very poor -.002
poverty: poor .016**
prob2 .069***
prob3 .152***
prob4 .178***
loan size: medium -.009
loan size: large -.056***
monitoring: with some difficulties -.018***
monitoring: hard to monitor -.127***
savings: slightly more than required .063***
savings: much more than required .078***
was found in Sagamba et al. (2013), which, on the one hand, constitutes a
deviation from the pro-social mission of microfinace, as the most needy are the
youngest and the oldest. On the other hand, this contributes to the stability of
the MFI by providing more loans to more experienced applicants.
The poverty level of the applicant is relevant to the allocation decision only
at high levels of poverty; extremely poor applicants have a 1.6% lower chance
of obtaining a microloan, holding other things equal.
Ethiopian legislation requires all applicants for a microloan to accumulate
a certain amount of savings in an MFI-held savings account. Applicants with
savings slightly more than required have a 6% greater chance of being allocated a
loan, and applicants with much greater savings have an 8% greater chance than
those who only meet the minimal savings requirement. The results of the choice
experiment suggest, therefore, that LOs are sensitive to the amount of savings
and favor applicants having savings above the minimal requirement. However,
the magnitude of the additional savings is not of great importance. By acquiring
more than only the minimal savings requirement, an applicant might signal her
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quality to the LO in terms of being able to exercise financial discipline and delay
gratification from more immediate consumption choices. Such an interpretation
is in line with the hyperbolic discounting literature on consumption vs. savings
choices (see e.g., Fredericks et al., (2000) for an overview, or Laibson (1997)).
5.1.2 Project Characteristics
The two most important determinants of microloan attribution among all in-
vestigated characteristics of an applicant and project are (i) the probability of
timely reimbursement – interpreted as indicative of the quality of the project –
and (ii) the difficulty of monitoring. The overall quality of the project charac-
terized by the perceived probability of repayments delays is of great importance
for LOs; a project with a 50% probability of repayment delays has an 18% lower
chance of approval than a project which has almost no risk of repayment delays.
Similarly, LOs are very sensitive to the difficulty of monitoring of the project;
a project which is difficult to monitor has a 13% lower chance than an easy to
monitor project.
Finally, the size of the loan for the project is also an important determinant
of LOs’ preferences for microloan allocation. Those applicants requesting larger
loans have a lower chance as compared to those requesting smaller loans; the
chances for obtaining a loan decreases by 6% for for a big loan as compared to
a small loan.12
5.2 Monitoring
5.2.1 Monitoring and Incentives
In the baseline estimation we find that higher levels of monitoring difficulty are
associated with smaller chances of being allocated a loan. Here we turn our
attention to the different incentives provided to the LO and the interaction of
these incentives with the importance assigned to monitoring difficulty in LO
preferences.
12See Table 3 for details on the sizes of big and small loans.
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Our study asks respondents to indicate which of five kinds of incentives are
provided to them. These incentives are rewards for: 1) lending more money; 2)
providing more loans (outreach); 3) timely reimbursement; 4) providing loans
to the poorest; 5) providing more loans to women. In the subsequent analysis,
we introduce indicator variables for the provision of each type of incentives in
the econometric model and estimate a model of the form (1). Detailed results
are provided in Appendix B and we summarize the results related to monitoring
in Table 4.
Table 4: The effect of incentive provision on the valuation of monitoring diffi-
culty.
Incentive type
1 2 3 4 5
Intermediate monitoring
difficulty -0.03 -0.04 -0.02 -0.09 0.01
Highest monitoring diffi-
culty -0.17*** -0.15*** -0.09 -0.15** -0.05
Note: The baseline is easy to monitor projects. The incentive types are 1 = Sum of
money, 2 = Number of loans (outreach), 3 = Timely reimbursement, 4 = Loans to the
poorest, 5 = Loans to women
The strongest effects are found when LOs are either provided incentives to
maximize the sum of money lent (1), maximizing the number of loans (2) or
providing loans to the poorest (4). The provision of these incentives makes
LOs more sensitive to the difficulty of monitoring; the high level of monitoring
difficulty decreases the probability of being allocated a loan by 15−17%. These
effects are present only for projects with high monitoring difficulty but not for
projects with intermediate monitoring difficulty.
From the analysis of the estimation results presented in Appendix B, one can
notice that the provision of certain incentives – based on the sum of disbursed
funds and timely reimbursement – influences only the importance assigned to
monitoring difficulty. When outreach is incentivized, the importance assigned
to monitoring difficulty and probability of timely reimbursements are affected.
These observations further motivate paying particular attention to these two
factors in studying the role of LOs in microfinance institutions.
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5.2.2 Monitoring and Mission Perception/Alignment with the Mis-
sion
We presume that the importance the LO assigns to monitoring difficulty will
depend on the perceived aims of the MFI; there is a basic trade-off between the
perceived aims of the MFI and monitoring difficulty. For instance, if the aim of
the MFI is helping the poor which are known to be harder to monitor, LOs will
have to assign less importance to monitoring difficulty. Otherwise it would be
impossible to help the poor. On the other hand, if the perceived aim of the MFI
is to make profit, the LO ought to avoid difficult to monitor projects because
difficult to monitor projects imply taking more financial risks.
We ask respondents to provide their views on what they perceive is the mis-
sion of their own MFI and we analyse how mission perception interacts with the
importance assigned to monitoring difficulty. First we ask respondents what
they perceive as the main aim of their respective MFIs and second we ask about
all the objectives their MFI. We found that the importance assigned to moni-
toring difficulty by LOs varies among MFIs with different missions (as perceived
by microloan officers). A summary of the results is provided in Tables 5 and
6 (for detailed estimation results see Appendix C). Technically, we split the
sample into subsamples based on each of the four possible aims and estimated
models of the form in (1). The coefficients β show the changes in the importance
assigned to monitoring difficulty by LOs in MFIs with certain (perceived) aims
are reported in tables 5 and 6. All the significant effects pertain to the projects
with high monitoring difficulty.
Table 5: Effect of perceived mission of MFI on the importance assigned to
monitoring difficulty.
Mission perception (one of the aims)
Support
poor
Support
women
Making
profit
Financial
stability
Intermediate monitoring
difficulty
-0.15 -0.07 -0.02 0.02
High monitoring difficulty -0.34*** 0.08 0.01 -0.07
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Table 6: Effect of perceived mission of MFI on the importance assigned to
monitoring difficulty.
Mission perception (the main aim)
Support
poor
Support
women
Making
profit
Financial
stability
Intermediate monitoring
difficulty
-0.05 -0.12 0.08 0.09
High monitoring difficulty -0.12* 0.06 0.18* 0.01
LOs who perceive as an aim of their MFIs supporting the poor assign a
lower importance to the difficulty of monitoring while those who perceive the
aim as making profit, assign a higher importance to the difficulty of monitoring.
We did not find statistically significant effects of other aims on the importance
assigned to monitoring difficulty.
5.2.3 Discretion of Loan Officers During Monitoring
This section examines the relationship between LO discretion and importance
assigned to monitoring difficulty. The necessity to report is associated with
relatively mild difficulties in running the borrower’s enterprise, while the ne-
cessity to impose a sanction is associated with relatively serious problem, or
violations of the loan use conditions. We therefore ask respondents to rate to
what extent they exercise discretion.13 We first examine the impact of differ-
ent degrees of discretion in reporting on the importance assigned to monitoring
difficulty. Technically, we reestimate the model of the form in (1) on subsam-
ples corresponding to different degrees of discretion and focus on the changes in
importance assigned to monitoring of difficulty between the subsamples. The
results are summarized in table 7, and detailed estimation results are presented
in Appendix E.
The effect of intermediate monitoring difficulty seems to vary with level
of discretion in reporting. For low levels of discretion (1 and 2), intermediate
difficulty does not seem to have any effect. As the level of discretion in reporting
13We used a scale from 1 to 4, where 1 means “reporting/imposing sanction immediately,”
i.e., minimal discretion and 4 means “you often take decisions on your own even when the
guidelines prescribe to do something else,” i.e., the highest degree of discretion.
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Table 7: Effect of discretion in reporting on the importance assigned to moni-
toring difficulty
Discretion in reporting
1 and 2 3 and 4
Intermediate monitoring difficulty -0.01 -0.08**
High monitoring difficulty -0.51*** -0.54***
Note: 1 = minimal level of discretion; 4 = maximum level of discretion.
increases, however, so does the importance assigned to intermediate difficulty.
For high levels of discretion (3 and 4), the negative effect increases from -0.01
to -0.08. When it comes the the high level of monitoring difficulty the effect is
generally large and negative.
We repeat this exercise for our measure of discretion in sanctioning and
detailed results are provided in Appendix E. As before, we summarize our
results related to monitoring in Table 8.
Table 8: Effect of discretion in sanctioning on the importance assigned to mon-
itoring difficulty
Discretion in sanctioning
1 and 2 3 and 4
Intermediate monitoring difficulty -0.02 -0.12***
High monitoring difficulty -0.54*** -0.53***
Note: 1 = minimal level of discretion; 4 = maximum level of discretion.
The effect of intermediate monitoring difficulty seems to vary with level of
discretion in sanctioning. For low levels of discretion (1 and 2), intermediate dif-
ficulty does not seem to have any effect. As the level of discretion in sanctioning
increases, however, so does the importance assigned to intermediate difficulty.
For high levels of discretion (3 and 4), the negative effect increases from −0.02
to −0.12. When it comes the the high level of monitoring difficulty the effect is
generally large and negative.
In general, our results indicate that LOs who exercise more discretion in
reporting or sanctioning also assign greater importance to monitoring difficulty
and are more likely to avoid hard to monitor projects.
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5.3 Clients savings
5.3.1 Savings and incentives
Here we again turn our attention to the different incentives provided to the LO
and the interaction of the incentives provided with the importance assigned to
client savings. In the baseline estimation we find that higher levels of savings are
associated with higher chances of being allocated a loan. In subsequent analysis,
we introduce indicator variables for the provision of each type of incentive and
estimate a model of the form in (2). Detailed results are provided in Appendix
B and we summarize the results related to savings in Table 9.
Table 9: Effect of incentive provision on the importance assigned to savings
level
Incentive type
1 2 3 4 5
Slightly more than compulsory
savings
0.05 -0.02 -0.2 -0.02 -0.10*
Savings much more than compul-
sory
-0.03 -0.04 -0.00 -0.12* -0.15**
Note: The incentive types are 1 = Sum of money, 2 = Number of loans (outreach),
3 = Timely reimbursement, 4 = Loans to the poorest, 5 = Loans to women
The strongest results are found for those LOs who state that they have an
incentive to provide loans to women (5). While higher than required savings are
associated with a higher valuation of an applicant’s project, being incentivized to
provide loans to women reduces the importance assigned to additional savings.
A similar, but weaker result is obtained for those who are incentivized to provide
loans to the poorest (4). Taken together, these results are inline with the pro-
social mission of microfinance.
5.3.2 Savings and Mission Perception/Alignment with the Mission
We found that importance assigned to savings level by LOs varies among MFIs
with different missions (as perceived by LOs) and a summary of the results
is provided in Tables 10 and 11 (for detailed estimation results see Appendix
C). Technically, we split the sample into subsamples based on each of the four
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possible aims and estimated models of the form (1). The coefficients β show the
importance assigned to savings level by perceived aim are reported in tables 10
and 11.
For those who perceive the mission to be supporting women, the coefficient
is negative, indicating that these LOs assign less importance to savings level.
This is to be expected if women are those who usually have a harder time
producing higher than required savings levels. On the other hand, for those who
perceive the mission to be making profit or maintaining financial sustainability,
additional savings much above the required minimum, increases importance
assigned to savings. Although slightly weaker statistically, a similar pattern
emerges when we repeat the analysis by the perceived main aim of the MFI
(Table 11).
Table 10: The importance assigned to savings level by mission perception.
Mission perception (one of the aims)
Support
poor
Support
women
Making
profit
Financial
stability
Slightly more than com-
pulsory savings
0.1 -0.09 0.09 0.07
Much more than compul-
sory savings
0.02 -0.16** 0.11* 0.16***
Table 11: The importance assigned to savings level by mission perception.
Mission perception (the main aim)
Support
poor
Support
women
Making
profit
Financial
stability
Savings slightly more
than compulsory
-0.02 -0.04 -0.05 0.12
Savings much more than
compulsory
-0.08 -0.27* 0.12 0.18*
As in the case with monitoring difficulty and mission perception, there is
a basic trade-off between perceived mission and the importance assigned to
savings. Those who perceive the mission to be supporting women assign less
importance to applicants with larger savings. This could be an indication of
favouritism of women as men more frequently hold larger savings. Indeed, our
result indicate that LOs dislike applicants with larger savings.
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On the other hand, those who perceive the aim as financial stability, assign
higher importance to high levels of savings; higher savings might indicate better
financial discipline of the applicant.
6 Implications for MFI governance
Loan officers constitute an important link between the MFI and the individual
borrower. Through loan allocation, LOs determine the portfolio of clients and
thereby determine the success of MFIs in terms of financial sustainability and
achieving social goals. LO preferences over loan allocation are therefore critical.
MFIs can, however, influence LO choices through incentive provision and LOs’
perception of organizational aims and priorities.
Our results have implications for MFI governance. While all MFIs exhibit
concern for both financial viability and social goals, there is considerable varia-
tion in priorities between the two. Loan officers are critical for implementation
of a given aim of an MFI. Organizational features, such as incentives, determine
the success in accomplishing MFI aims by influencing LO allocation decisions.
We find, however, that straightforward attempts to steer loan allocation in favor
of socially desirable groups do not always have the intended effect.
Our results suggest a number of recommendations for those MFIs that pri-
oritise loan provision to women. In this case, our results indicate that straight-
forward policies will likely be effective. First, these MFIs can incentivise LOs to
provide more loans to female applicants. Second, they can direct additional ef-
forts to conveying this aim to LOs, as those who perceive that supporting women
is an MFI aim exhibit stronger preferences for allocating loans to women. These
strategies, however, may have indirect effects that warrant further attention and
ought to be taken into account. For instance, when LOs perceive that providing
loans to women as an aim, or when they are provided with an incentive to allo-
cate more loans to women, they also start paying less attention to the savings of
the applicant. This may be desirable, as women in developing countries usually
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have less savings than men, but may also jeopardize the financial viability of
the MFI.
For MFIs that prioritise supporting the poor, our recommendations are more
modest. We do not find a significant direct effect of incentives to provide loans
to the poor, although the effect is in the right direction. This incentive may
work, but we have found only weak evidence in its support. On the other hand,
an MFI can better reach its target group by convincingly conveying its aim to
LOs. This benefit is especially large when the LO perceives helping the poor as
the main aim of the MFI, as opposed to when it is one of the perceived aims.
MFIs should therefore narrowly frame their mission statement as supporting the
poor. These strategies, however, may also have unintended consequences. LOs
provided with incentives to allocate more loans to the poor, or who perceive the
aim as supporting the poor, pay less attention to the savings of the applicant,
and discriminate more against projects that are difficult to monitor. These
effects ought to be taken into account when designing incentives for a particular
MFI.
Finally, our results also imply recommendations for MFIs that prioritise
financial stability. We find that providing additional incentives to LOs for higher
reimbursement rates does not seem to have any effect on prioritising projects
with higher chances of timely reimbursement. On the other hand, we find
some evidence that, when the aim of the MFI is perceived as making profit or
as financial stability, LOs do prioritize projects with higher chances of timely
reimbursement. In addition, LOs will prioritise applicants with larger amounts
of savings if they perceive that the aim is to make profit or achieve financial
sustainability. MFIs prioritising financial stability should therefore focus on
clearly conveying this aim to their LOs rather than providing incentives.
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7 Conclusion
Loan officers play an important intermediary role in the relationship between
MFIs and borrowers and in this way determine the success of financial interme-
diation between donors and the financially constrained poor in the developing
world. We studied LO preferences over loan allocation and how these preferences
interact with both incentives and the perceived aim of the MFI. We generally
found that LOs pay attention both to borrower characteristics related to pro-
social aims and to the characteristics of the project that relate to the financial
sustainability of the MFI. Our results also show that MFIs can indeed influ-
ence LOs’ allocation decisions through incentive provision and by emphasizing
organizational aims.
The most important determinants of loan allocation are those related to the
financial viability of MFIs, such as the quality of the project as measured by the
probability of repayment delays and difficulty of monitoring. Characteristics
related to pro-social aims, such as gender and poverty, play a significant but
lesser role. In addition, applicants with savings above the minimal required
level are given priority.
We found that, generally, incentives provided by the MFI influence LOs’
allocation decisions. Those incentives that target specific characteristics of an
applicant, such as gender or poverty level, seem to influence allocation decisions
in the intended direction. For most incentives, we found an additional negative
effect on projects that are difficult to monitor. In addition, when LOs are
incentivized to provide loans to the poorest or to women, they pay less attention
to the level of savings of an applicant. We also found that the perceived aim of
the MFI affects LOs’ allocation decisions. We found that, when LOs perceive
supporting the poor as the aim of the MFI, they tend to avoid allocating loans
to those projects that are difficult to monitor. Those that perceive supporting
women as the aim of the MFI pay less attention to savings level and those that
perceive achieving financial stability as the aim pay more attention to savings.
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Finally, we found that LO discretion in reporting and sanctioning is important
for the effect of monitoring difficulty in allocation decisions; more discretion is
associated with an additional negative effect of monitoring difficulty.
The choice experimental methodology constitutes a novel approach to the
study of microfinance. Commonly applied methodologies based on granted loans
are notoriously problematic for the study of microfinance due to selection bias.
Without any knowledge of applicants who are denied microloans, it is not pos-
sible to study what determines loan allocation. Although based on hypothetical
choices, choice experimental methodology is a viable alternative. Successful fi-
nancial intermediation by MFIs is in large part determined by the LOs and the
decisions they make. Here, we have studied LO preferences for loan allocation
and its relationship to organizational structure. On the basis of our analy-
sis, we have developed recommendations specific to MFI objectives. Further
exploration of the impact of other constraints on LO activities, such geograph-
ical proximity, might prove fruitful for improving financial intermediation and,
ultimately, access to finance for the poor.
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Appendix
A Pooled Regression
Marginal Effects for the Pooled Estimation.
dp/dx SE z P > |z|
age2 .0443 .0093 4.765 1.9e-06
age3 .0519 .0096 5.429 5.7e-08
age4 .0297 .0096 3.089 .002
gender -.0221 .0097 -2.284 .0223
pov2 -.0576 .005 -11.53 9.1e-31
pov3 -.0016 .007 -.231 .8173
prob2 .016 .0075 2.146 .0319
prob3 .0689 .0087 7.928 2.2e-15
prob4 .152 .0073 20.69 4.0e-95
loan2 .1781 .0072 24.79 1.e-135
loan3 -.0094 .007 -1.337 .1811
monit2 -.0557 .0067 -8.341 7.4e-17
monit3 -.0181 .0069 -2.636 .0084
savings2 -.1271 .0063 -20.1 7.9e-90
savings3 .0633 .0067 9.517 1.8e-21
savings3 .0781 .0068 11.49 1.5e-30
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B Impact of incentives
Attribute baseline max sum outreach reimb. rate poorest women
age2 .178*** .171*** .162*** .133*** .163*** .176***
(.038) (.043) (.046) (.044) (.042) (.044)
age3 .208*** .205*** .221*** .213*** .208*** .21***
(.039) (.044) (.047) (.046) (.043) (.045)
age4 .119*** .154*** .167*** .109** .111*** .146***
(.039) (.044) (.047) (.046) (.043) (.045)
age5 -.0884** -.108** -.117** -.129*** -.0978** -.0913**
(.039) (.045) (.048) (.046) (.043) (.045)
gender -.23*** -.217*** -.214*** -.233*** -.223*** -.209***
(.02) (.023) (.024) (.023) (.022) (.023)
poverty2 -.0064 .0206 .0261 .014 .0102 -.0064
(.028) (.032) (.034) (.033) (.031) (.032)
poverty3 .064** .0764** .0694* .0844** .083** .0397˜
(.03) (.034) (.036) (.034) (.033) (.034)
prob2 .277*** .297*** .257*** .309*** .277*** .283***
(.035) (.04) (.042) (.041) (.039) (.04)
prob3 .631*** .646*** .608*** .632*** .641*** .617***
(.033) (.038) (.041) (.039) (.037) (.039)
prob4 .75*** .728*** .695*** .723*** .763*** .752***
(.034) (.039) (.041) (.04) (.037) (.039)
loan size2 -.0377˜ -.0495˜ -.0269 -.0332 -.0581* -.0363
(.028) (.032) (.034) (.033) (.031) (.032)
loan size3 -.223*** -.249*** -.221*** -.222*** -.235*** -.219***
(.027) (.031) (.033) (.032) (.03) (.031)
monit2 -.0726*** -.0653** -.0635* -.0684** -.059* -.0792**
(.028) (.032) (.034) (.033) (.031) (.032)
monit3 -.518*** -.479*** -.475*** -.497*** -.491*** -.511***
(.027) (.031) (.033) (.032) (.03) (.031)
savings2 .255*** .244*** .266*** .261*** .257*** .28***
(.027) (.031) (.033) (.032) (.03) (.031)
savings3 .316*** .328*** .335*** .319*** .34*** .357***
(.028) (.032) (.034) (.033) (.031) (.032)
age2X .042 .0475 .158* .0579 .0016
(.088) (.08) (.084) (.099) (.087)
age3X .023 -.0451 -.0182 -.0332 -.0071
(.09) (.082) (.086) (.101) (.09)
age4X -.138˜ -.148* .0324 4.3e-04 -.103˜
(.088) (.081) (.084) (.099) (.088)
age5X .0736 .055 .13˜ .0152 .0076
(.09) (.082) (.086) (.1) (.09)
gender2X -.0579˜ -.0448 .007 -.0468 -.0846*
(.044) (.04) (.042) (.049) (.044)
poverty2X -.1˜ -.0796˜ -.0622 -.0753 .0153
(.061) (.056) (.058) (.068) (.061)
poverty3X -.0562 -.0108 -.0693 -.106˜ .0776˜
(.063) (.058) (.061) (.07) (.063)
prob2X -.0859 .0785 -.114˜ -5.0e-04 .0142
(.076) (.07) (.072) (.085) (.076)
prob3X -.0519 .0938˜ .0047 -.0289 .0691
(.075) (.069) (.071) (.083) (.075)
prob4X .102˜ .185*** .109˜ -.0614 .0309
(.078) (.071) (.074) (.087) (.077)
loan size2X .0383 -.0367 -.021 .0852˜ -.0227
(.062) (.057) (.059) (.069) (.061)
loan size3X .094˜ -.0205 -.0127 .0477 -.0337
(.061) (.056) (.058) (.068) (.061)
monit2X -.0343 -.0372 -.0194 -.0852˜ .0104
(.063) (.057) (.06) (.069) (.062)
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Attribute baseline max sum outreach reimb. rate poorest women
monit3X -.173*** -.152*** -.0879˜ -.151** -.0471
(.063) (.057) (.06) (.07) (.062)
savings2X .0521 -.0239 -.0154 -.0193 -.102*
(.062) (.056) (.059) (.068) (.061)
savings3X -.0276 -.0381 .0025 -.123* -.15**
(.062) (.057) (.06) (.069) (.062)
2
cons -.03˜ -.0281 -.0265 -.0299˜ -.0297˜ -.0269
(.025) (.025) (.025) (.025) (.025) (.025)
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D Loan Officers, Monitoring and Discretion
D.1 Characteristics of Loan Officers
Gender of Loan Officers
N Percentage
Male 627 80
Female 156 20
Total 783 100
Age of Loan Officers
Item N Percentage
≤ 19 7 1
20-29 469 59
30-39 287 36
40-49 33 4
≥ 50 1 0
Total 797 100
The highest level of education attained
N Percentage
Secondary incomplete 7 1
Secondary school complete 86 11
TVET Certificate 33 4
Diploma 528 67
Higher education (4 years of University) 128 16
Masters Degree 1 0
Other 1 0
Total 784 100
Years of service in the MFI sector
in the MFI sector In the current MFI
< 1 1–2 3–5 5+
< 1 91.37 6.47 0.72 1.44
1–2 5.26 90.79 2.63 1.32
3–5 6.02 4.22 85.54 4.22
5+ 3.04 3.34 3.95 89.67
Proficiency of Loan officers
Degree of proficiency
1 2 3 4 5 6
bookkeeping 0.38 0.88 4.25 18.25 37.88 38.38
organization of production process 0.88 1.38 5.39 17.04 41.35 33.96
selling 3.75 4.38 8.39 23.15 37.55 22.78
find clients 2.13 1.63 4.39 16.06 34.38 41.41
buying equipment 9.72 6.19 12.37 23.48 29.55 18.69
34
The Frequency of incentive provision
max sum outreach reimb. rate poorest women
share of LOs 0.25 0.35 0.29 0.19 0.26
D.2 Monitoring
What is done during monitoring
share of answers 5, 6 N
Asking the borrower about plans for the future 0.68 775
Giving advice on budgeting 0.693 773
Giving advice on running the enterprise 0.798 768
Checking account records 0.505 772
Checking the physical state of enterprise 0.777 767
1=never,...,6=very often
What makes monitoring difficult
share of answers 5, 6 N
Distance to Borrower 0.541 777
Time necessary for monitoring 0.533 775
Non-cooperativeness of borrower 0.415 768
scale: 1=not important at all, 6=very important
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D.3 Discretion
Discretion when reporting is required
N Percentage
You always report immediately 192 25
You usually report immediately, but sometimes you give
a borrower some additional time before reporting
393 51
You usually report immediately, but sometimes you do
not, on your discretion, for example if you think that it
will be better for the borrower.
146 19
You often take decisions on your own even when the
guidelines prescribe to do something else
47 6
Total 778 100
Discretion when imposing sanctions is required
N Percentage
You always report immediately and sanction is imposed 259 33
You usually report immediately but you sometimes give
some additional time before
328 42
You usually report immediately, but sometimes you do
not, on your discretion, but do something discretion in
favour of the borrower
116 15
You often take decisions on your own even when the
guidelines prescribe to do something else
29 4
You always report–but in some cases sanctions are not
imposed immediately due to various reasons
44 6
Total 776 100
D.4 Objective Perception
Objective Perception
N Percentage
Supporting the poor 555 70
Supporting women 48 6
Making profit 87 11
Financial sustainablity – operate without deficit 100 13
Total 790 100
The alignment of own views on how microloans should be allocated
with MFI’s objective
N Percentage
More or less aligned 131 16
In general, aligned 158 20
Strongly aligned 272 34
Fully aligned 238 30
Total 799 100
36
To what extent do you agree with practical policies
N Percentage
More or less agree 126 16
In general, agree 184 23
Strongly agree 210 26
Fully agree 280 35
Total 800 100
E The Impact of Discretion
Discretion in reporting Discretion in sanctioning
1 and 2 3 and 4 1 and 2 3 and 4
age2 .262*** .147*** .207*** .189***
(.0758) (.046) (.0671) (.0503)
age3 .235*** .223*** .185*** .255***
(.0778) (.0472) (.0683) (.0516)
age4 .126˜ .121** .0824˜ .179***
(.0781) (.0472) (.0688) (.0516)
age5 -.148* -.0767˜ -.0766 -.0631˜
(.078) (.0474) (.0683) (.0518)
gender -.209*** -.251*** -.285*** -.216***
(.0405) (.0244) (.0353) (.0268)
poverty2 -.0499 .014 .0238 -.0358
(.0571) (.034) (.0497) (.0372)
poverty3 .0093 .0806** .0792˜ .0508˜
(.0604) (.0366) (.0532) (.0399)
prob2 .232*** .27*** .389*** .213***
(.0718) (.0429) (.0632) (.0468)
prob3 .471*** .654*** .745*** .543***
(.0674) (.0406) (.0598) (.0442)
prob4 .611*** .744*** .837*** .668***
(.0678) (.0414) (.0599) (.0453)
loan size2 -.0538 -.0166 -.0616˜ -.0037
(.0575) (.0344) (.0501) (.0376)
loan size3 -.259*** -.224*** -.21*** -.22***
(.0547) (.0329) (.0484) (.0357)
monit2 -.0149 -.0817** .0174 -.115***
(.056) (.0337) (.049) (.0368)
monit3 -.509*** -.537*** -.544*** -.527***
(.0545) (.0328) (.0479) (.0359)
savings2 .229*** .273*** .239*** .288***
(.0549) (.033) (.0478) (.0363)
savings3 .284*** .34*** .212*** .358***
(.0562) (.0341) (.0495) (.0372)
cons -.0427 -.0212 -.0908** -.0049
(.0515) (.0307) (.0447) (.0337)
37
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